

# **UNH IOL iSCSI CONSORTIUM**

## **CHAP Test Suite for iSCSI Targets** *Version 2.0*

*Technical Document*



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**MODIFICATION RECORD**

- [1] **June 16, 2003 (Version 0.1) DRAFT RELEASE**  
David Woolf: Initial draft release to draft 20 of the iSCSI standard
- [2] **February 2, 2006 (Version 1.0) FINAL RELEASE**  
David Woolf: Test Suite updated to match final RFC 3720 standard. Changed Observable Results of tests 4.1 and 4.4.  
Adjusted procedure of tests 5.2 and 5.3.
- [3] **January 5, 2007 (Version 1.1) FINAL RELEASE**  
Aaron Bascom: Changed title page.
- [4] **March 9, 2009 (Version 2.0) FINAL RELEASE**  
Patrick MacArthur,  
Samuel Vohr: Test Suite updated to match iSCSI Corrections and Clarifications RFC.  
Updated test #2.6.1.  
Renumbered all tests to make room for new "Basic CHAP Tests" test group  
Added tests #1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.

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**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The University of New Hampshire would like to acknowledge the efforts of the following individuals in the development of this test suite.

David Woolf	University of New Hampshire
Aaron Bascom	University of New Hampshire
Samuel Vohr	University of New Hampshire
Patrick MacArthur	University of New Hampshire

## **INTRODUCTION**

The University of New Hampshire's InterOperability Laboratory (IOL) is an institution designed to improve the interoperability of standards based products by providing an environment where a product can be tested against other implementations of a standard. This particular suite of tests has been developed to help implementers evaluate the CHAP Authentication functionality of their iSCSI targets.

These tests are designed to determine if an iSCSI product conforms to specifications defined in both *IETF RFC 3720 iSCSI* (hereafter referred to as the "iSCSI Standard") as well as updates as contained in *IETF RFC 5048 iSCSI Corrections and Clarifications RFC* (hereafter referred to as "iSCSI Corrections and Clarifications"). Successful completion of all tests contained in this suite does not guarantee that the tested device will successfully operate with other iSCSI products. However, when combined with satisfactory operation in the IOL's interoperability test bed, these tests provide a reasonable level of confidence that the Device Under Test (DUT) will function properly in many iSCSI environments.

The tests contained in this document are organized in order to simplify the identification of information related to a test, and to facilitate in the actual testing process. Tests are separated into groups, primarily in order to reduce setup time in the lab environment, however the different groups typically also tend to focus on specific aspects of device functionality. A dot-notated naming system is used to catalog the tests, where the first number always indicates a specific group of tests in which the test suite is based. The second and third numbers indicate the test's group number and test number within that group, respectively. This format allows for the addition of future tests in the appropriate groups without requiring the renumbering of the subsequent tests.

The test definitions themselves are intended to provide a high-level description of the motivation, resources, procedures, and methodologies specific to each test. Formally, each test description contains the following sections:

### **Purpose**

The purpose is a brief statement outlining what the test attempts to achieve. The test is written at the functional level.

### **References**

This section specifies all reference material *external* to the test suite, including the specific sub clauses references for the test in question, and any other references that might be helpful in understanding the test methodology and/or test results. External sources may also be referenced by a bracketed number (e.g., [1]) when mentioned in the test description. Any other references in the test description that are not indicated in this manner refer to elements within the test suite document itself (e.g., "Appendix 5.A", or "Table 5.1.1-1")

### **Resource Requirements**

The requirements section specifies the test hardware and/or software needed to perform the test. This is generally expressed in terms of minimum requirements, however in some cases specific equipment manufacturer/model information may be provided.

### **Last Modification**

This specifies the date of the last modification to this test.

### **Discussion**

The discussion covers the assumptions made in the design or implementation of the test, as well as known limitations. Other items specific to the test are covered here as well.

### **Test Setup**

The setup section describes the initial configuration of the test environment. Small changes in the configuration should not be included here, and are generally covered in the test procedure section (next).

### **Procedure**

The procedure section of the test description contains the systematic instructions for carrying out the test. It provides a cookbook approach to testing, and may be interspersed with observable results.

### **Observable Results**

This section lists the specific observables that can be examined by the tester in order to verify that the DUT is operating properly. When multiple values for an observable are possible, this section provides a short discussion on how to interpret them. The determination of a pass or fail outcome for a particular test is generally based on the successful (or unsuccessful) detection of a specific observable.

### **Possible Problems**

This section contains a description of known issues with the test procedure, which may affect test results in certain situations. It may also refer the reader to test suite appendices and/or other external sources that may provide more detail regarding these issues.

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**REFERENCES**

The following documents are referenced in this text:

iSCSI Standard IETF RFC 3720

CHAP Standard IETF RFC 1994


iSCSI Corrections and Clarifications IETF RFC 5048



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**TEST SETUPS**

The following test setups are used in this test suite:

Test Setup 1:



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**GROUP 1: BASIC CHAP TESTS**

**Overview:** This group of tests verifies basic CHAP functionality, defined in RFC 3720 and updated in RFC 5048. Comments and questions regarding the implementation of these tests are welcome, and may be forwarded to Peter Scruton, UNH InterOperability Lab ([pjs@iol.unh.edu](mailto:pjs@iol.unh.edu)).

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**Test #1.1: Premature Transition Check**

**Purpose:** To verify that the DUT does not transition until the initiator has been authenticated.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** March 17, 2009

**Discussion:** For CHAP, in the first step, the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1,A2; where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C; where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. In the third step, the initiator MUST continue with: CHAP\_N=<N> CHAP\_R=<R>. Whenever an iSCSI target gets a response whose keys, or their values, are not according to the step definition, it MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Initiator Error" or "Missing Parameter" status.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with CHAP\_A=5 and values for CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should send an empty Login Request PDU with T=1, CSG=0, and NSG=3.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits a Login Response PDU with the CHAP\_C=C and CHAP\_I=I key=value pairs.
- Verify that the values for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number, no larger than 1 byte. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.
- Verify that the DUT does not transition to Full Feature Phase, but instead sends a Login Reject PDU with status "Initiator Error" or "Missing Parameter".

**Possible Problems:** There is no requirement that CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C be in the same Login Response PDU.

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**Test #1.2: Transition After Initiator Authentication**

**Purpose:** To verify that the DUT transitions after the initiator has been authenticated.

**Reference:**

[1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** March 17, 2009

**Discussion:** For CHAP, in the first step, the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1,A2; where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C; where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. In the third step, the initiator MUST continue with: CHAP\_N=<N> CHAP\_R=<R>.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with CHAP\_A=5 and values for CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should send the proper CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R values, with T=1, CSG=0, and NSG=1.
- Proceed through the Operational Parameter Negotiation Phase through Full Feature Phase.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits a Login Response PDU with the CHAP\_C=C and CHAP\_I=I key=value pairs.
- Verify that the values for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number, no larger than 1 byte. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.
- Verify that the DUT does transition to Operational Negotiation Phase.

**Possible Problems:** There is no requirement that CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C be in the same Login Response PDU.

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**Test #1.3: Transition After Mutual Authentication**

**Purpose:** To verify that the DUT transitions after the initiator and target have been authenticated.

**Reference:**

[1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** March 17, 2009

**Discussion:** For CHAP, in the first step, the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1,A2; where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C; where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. In the third step, the initiator MUST continue with: CHAP\_N=<N> CHAP\_R=<R>.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with CHAP\_A=5 and values for CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should send the proper CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R values, as well as values for CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C to authenticate the DUT. The DUT should respond with correct values for CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R.
- The Testing Station should send an empty Login Request PDU with T=1, CSG=0, and NSG=1.
- Proceed through the Operational Parameter Negotiation Phase through Full Feature Phase.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits a Login Response PDU with the CHAP\_C=C and CHAP\_I=I key=value pairs.
- Verify that the values for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number, no larger than 1 byte. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.
- Verify that the CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R values are correct.
- Verify that the DUT does transition to Operational Negotiation Phase.

**Possible Problems:** There is no requirement that CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C be in the same Login Response PDU.

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**GROUP 2: CHAP\_A VERIFICATION**

**Overview:** This group of tests verifies the proper use of the CHAP\_A key, defined in RFC 3720 and updated in RFC 5048. Comments and questions regarding the implementation of these tests are welcome, and may be forwarded to Peter Scruton, UNH InterOperability Lab ([pjs@iol.unh.edu](mailto:pjs@iol.unh.edu)).

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**Test #2.1: CHAP\_A Valid Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_A key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 3

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP, in the first step, the initiator **MUST** use: CHAP\_A=A1,A2; where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target **MUST** answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C; where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. A value of CHAP\_A = 5 is required by RFC 1994. The value 5 indicates support for CHAP with the MD5 hash algorithm.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT responds the received CHAP\_A key with CHAP\_A=5.
- Verify that the DUT transmits a Login Response PDU with the CHAP\_C=C and CHAP\_I=I key=value pairs.
- Verify that the values for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number, no larger than 1 byte. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.

**Possible Problems:** There is no requirement that CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C be in the same Login Response PDU.

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**Test #2.2: CHAP\_A Valid Value In List**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_A key=value pair which contains a list of valid and invalid values.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 3

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP, in the first step, the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1,A2; where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C; where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. A value of CHAP\_A = 5 is required by RFC 1994. The value 5 indicates support for CHAP with the MD5 hash algorithm. In this test a list is provided which contains valid and invalid values.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=1,3,5,9.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT recognizes that the required value of 5 is present
- Verify that the DUT responds the received CHAP\_A key with CHAP\_A=5.
- Verify that the DUT transmits a Login Response PDU with the CHAP\_C=C and CHAP\_I=I key=value pairs.
- Verify that the values for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.

**Possible Problems:** There is no requirement that CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C be in the same Login Response PDU.



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**Test #2.3: CHAP\_A Invalid Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_A key=value pair which does not contain a valid value.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 3

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP, in the first step, the initiator **MUST** use: CHAP\_A=A1,A2; where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target **MUST** answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C; where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. A value of CHAP\_A = 5 is required by RFC 1994. The value 5 indicates support for CHAP with the MD5 hash algorithm. In this test only an invalid value is provided.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=WickedGood.
  
- Verify that the DUT recognizes that the required value of 5 is not present, and no other valid value is present. The DUT is expected to transmit a Login Reject with 'Authentication failure' as the Status code.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.

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**Test #2.4: CHAP\_A Valid Value Not In List**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_A key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 3

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP, in the first step, the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1,A2; where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C; where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. A value of CHAP\_A = 5 is required by RFC 1994. The value 5 indicates support for CHAP with the MD5 hash algorithm. In this test only invalid values are provided.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=1,3,7,9.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT recognizes that the required value of 5 is not present, and the DUT transmits a Login Reject with 'Authentication Failure' as the Status code.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.

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**Test #2.5: CHAP\_A Present and Out of Order**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds when CHAP\_A is received out of order.

**Reference:**

[1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP, in the first step, the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1,A2; where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C; where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_I=I, CHAP\_C=C, CHAP\_A=5.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT recognizes that this violates the step definitions and the DUT transmits a Login Reject with 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter' as the Status code.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Authentication Failure'. This is acceptable.

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**Test #2.6: CHAP\_A Not Received**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds when CHAP\_A is not received.

**Reference:**

[1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP, in the first step, the initiator **MUST** use: CHAP\_A=A1,A2; where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target **MUST** answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C; where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_I=I, CHAP\_C=C.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT recognizes that this violates the step definitions and the DUT transmits a Login Reject with 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter' as the Status code.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Authentication Failure'. This is acceptable.

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*InterOperability Laboratory*  
**GROUP 3: CHAP\_I VERIFICATION**

**Overview:** This group of tests verifies the proper use of the CHAP\_I key, defined in RFC 3720 and updated in RFC 5048. Comments and questions regarding the implementation of these tests are welcome, and may be forwarded to Peter Scruton, UNH InterOperability Lab ([pjs@iol.unh.edu](mailto:pjs@iol.unh.edu)).

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**Test #3.1: CHAP\_I Valid Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_I key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. The Target is expected to reply with CHAP\_N and a CHAP\_R which matches the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C. The CHAP\_I key should be a 1 byte hex value. CHAP\_I is an identifier that aids in matching challenges, responses, and replies.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the values transmitted by the DUT for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number, no larger than 1 byte. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.
- Verify that the DUT responds to the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C with a correct CHAP\_R, and also offers a valid CHAP\_N. CHAP\_N should be a text string between 1 and 255 bytes in length. CHAP\_R should be a binary value of 16 bytes, if using MD5 hash algorithm.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #3.2: CHAP\_I Invalid Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received invalid CHAP\_I key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. The Target is expected to reply with CHAP\_N and a CHAP\_R which matches the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C. The CHAP\_I key should be a 1 byte hex value.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I as a string and CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the values transmitted by the DUT for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number, no larger than 1 byte. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.
- Verify that the DUT responds to the received CHAP\_I with Login Reject 'Authentication Failure' status.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.

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**Test #3.3: CHAP\_I No Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_I key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. The Target is expected to reply with CHAP\_N and a CHAP\_R which matches the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C. The CHAP\_I key should be a 1 byte hex value.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I with no value and CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the values transmitted by the DUT for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number, no larger than 1 byte. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.
- Verify that the DUT responds to the received CHAP\_I key with Login Reject 'Authentication Failure' status.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.



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**Test #3.4: CHAP\_I Too Big Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_I key=value pair which has an invalid value.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. The Target is expected to reply with CHAP\_N and a CHAP\_R which matches the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C. The CHAP\_I key should be a 1 byte hex value.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I which has a value that is 2 bytes long instead of 1, and CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the values transmitted by the DUT for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number, no larger than 1 byte. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.
- Verify that the DUT responds to the received CHAP\_I key with Login Reject 'Authentication Failure' status.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.

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**Test #3.5.1: CHAP\_I Out of Order**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_I key=value pair which is out of order.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 20, 2009

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5, CHAP\_I.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT responds to the received CHAP\_I key with Login Reject 'Authentication Failure' status.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.

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**Test #3.5.2: CHAP\_I Out of Order**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_I key=value pair received out of order.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 20, 2009

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. The Target is expected to reply with CHAP\_N and a CHAP\_R which matches the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the values transmitted by the DUT for the CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I keys are valid. CHAP\_I should be a number, no larger than 1 byte. CHAP\_C should be a binary value not exceeding 1024 bytes.
- Verify that the DUT does not respond to the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C values by sending CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R, as this would violate the step definition. The DUT can choose to send an empty Login Response, indicating that it is waiting for the Testing Station to transmit CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R to complete the step.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject. Although none of the behavior described in the procedure is illegal, a Login Reject is acceptable.

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**Test #3.6.1: CHAP\_I Reused on Second Connection (Informative)**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_I key=value pair when the CHAP\_I value is used on 2 connections. This test is informative only.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1
- [3] RFC 5048 Clause 7.4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** March 17, 2009

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. The Target is expected to reply with CHAP\_N and a CHAP\_R which matches the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C.

The Identifier field is one octet. The Identifier (CHAP\_I) field MUST be changed each time a Challenge (CHAP\_C) is sent. The Challenge Value MUST be changed each time a Challenge is sent. However, according to RFC 5048, unless RFC 3720 or [RFC 5048] requires it, an iSCSI implementation is not required to do an exhaustive protocol conformance check on an incoming iSCSI PDU. The iSCSI implementation especially is not required to double-check the remote iSCSI implementation's conformance to protocol requirements.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.
- The DUT is expected to respond with CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R. Move on to the Operational Parameter Negotiation then to Full Feature Phase operations.
- Open a second connection to the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer the same CHAP\_I and a new CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.

**Observable Results:**

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- The DUT should reject the second instance of CHAP\_I received from the Testing Station if it has a strong implementation of CHAP. The DUT may also accept the reused CHAP\_I.

**Possible Problems:** The standard does not mandate that the target reject a reused CHAP\_I. The CHAP\_I value is not used directly by iSCSI, since the iSCSI protocol provides strict step definitions in order to match challenges with responses. Also, since CHAP\_I is only one byte, the values will eventually be reused. Thus, an implementation of CHAP may accept a reused CHAP\_I. However, although the CHAP\_I value is not used directly by iSCSI, it may be used if the CHAP authentication is offloaded to another server. In addition, a reused CHAP\_I value could indicate a potential replay attack. Thus, an implementation of CHAP may reject a reused CHAP\_I.

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**Test #3.6.2: CHAP\_I Different on Second Connection**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_I key=value pair when a second CHAP\_I is used on a second connection.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 20, 2009

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. The Target is expected to reply with CHAP\_N and a CHAP\_R which matches the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the DUT and the Testing Station with the same CHAP secret.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, and CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.
- The DUT is expected to respond with CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R. Move on the Operational Parameter Negotiation then to Full Feature Phase operations.
- Open a second connection to the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer a new CHAP\_I and a new CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT accepts each instance of CHAP\_I received from the Testing Station and does not transmit Login Reject.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #3.7.1: CHAP\_I Reflected**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_I key=value pair even when the received CHAP\_I value is the same as the CHAP\_I sourced by the DUT.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 20, 2009

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. The Target is expected to reply with CHAP\_N and a CHAP\_R which matches the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer the same CHAP\_I as the DUT and a new CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT accepts each instance of CHAP\_I received from the Testing Station and does not transmit Login Reject.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #3.7.2: CHAP\_I Reflected on Second Connection**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_I key=value pair even when the received CHAP\_I value is the same as the CHAP\_I sourced by the DUT.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 20, 2009

**Discussion:** For CHAP the initiator MUST use: CHAP\_A=A1 A2 Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference. The target MUST answer with a Login reject with the "Authentication Failure" status or reply with: CHAP\_A=A CHAP\_I=I CHAP\_C=C. Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator. At this point if the initiator requires Target Authentication it should transmit CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. The Target is expected to reply with CHAP\_N and a CHAP\_R which matches the received CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.
- The DUT is expected to respond with CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R. Move on the Operational Parameter Negotiation then to Full Feature Phase operations.
- Open a second connection to the DUT.
- During the Security Negotiation Phase of Login, the Testing Station should offer AuthMethod=CHAP. The DUT is expected to respond with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer the same CHAP\_I used by the DUT on the first connection and a new CHAP\_C (8 bytes) to request Target Authentication.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT accepts each instance of CHAP\_I received from the Testing Station, and does not transmit Login Reject.

**Possible Problems:** None.



## **GROUP 4: CHAP\_C VERIFICATION**

**Overview:** This group of tests verifies the proper use of the CHAP\_C (CHAP Challenge) key, defined in RFC 3720 and updated in RFC 5048. Comments and questions regarding the implementation of these tests are welcome, and may be forwarded to Peter Scruton, UNH InterOperability Lab ([pjs@iol.unh.edu](mailto:pjs@iol.unh.edu)).

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**Test #4.1: CHAP\_C Reused**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_C key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2.1, 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Challenge Value MUST be changed each time a Challenge is sent.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a session of SessionType=Normal to the DUT. After the first connection reaches the Full Feature Phase, the Testing Station should start a second connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT uses different values for CHAP\_C on each connection.

**Possible Problems:** This item is not testable if the DUT does not support multiple connections.

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**Test #4.2: CHAP\_C Big Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_C key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2.1, 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Challenge Value is binary value between 1 and 1024 bytes.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should respond with valid values for CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I. CHAP\_C should also be offered, formatted as a binary, for size 1024 bytes.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT does not end the negotiation but rather responds with valid and accurate values for CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #4.3: CHAP\_C Small Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_C key=value pair.

**Reference:**

[1] RFC 3720 11.1.4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Challenge Value is binary value between 1 and 1024 bytes.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should respond with valid values for CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I. CHAP\_C should also be offered, formatted as a binary, for size 1 byte.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT does not end the negotiation but rather responds with valid and accurate values for CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #4.4: CHAP\_C Too Big Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_C key=value pair.

**Reference:**

[1] RFC 3720 11.1.4

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Challenge Value is binary value between 1 and 1024 bytes.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should respond with valid values for CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I. CHAP\_C should also be offered formatted as a binary with a length of 1028.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT end the negotiation with a Login Reject with status 'Authentication Failure'.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.

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**Test #4.5: CHAP\_C Out of Order**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_C key=value pair when received out of order.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2.1, 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Challenge Value is binary value between 1 and 1024 bytes.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5 and CHAP\_C. CHAP\_C should be formatted as a binary and be 8 bytes long.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT end the negotiation with a Login Reject with status 'Authentication Failure'.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.

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**Test #4.6: CHAP\_C Receive Reused**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_C key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2.1
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Challenge Value **MUST** be changed each time a Challenge is sent. Originators **MUST NOT** reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication. Responders **MUST** check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP connection if it occurs.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a session of SessionType=Normal to the DUT. After the first connection reaches the Full Feature Phase, the Testing Station should start a second connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R responses. The DUT should offer the different CHAP\_I and identical CHAP\_C values on each connection. These values should not be the same as the values offered by the DUT.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits Login Reject with 'Authentication Failure' Status. The DUT is expected to close the connection.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable. This item is not testable if the DUT does not support multiple connections.

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**Test #4.7: CHAP\_C Reflected**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_C key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2.1
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Challenge Value **MUST** be changed each time a Challenge is sent. Originators **MUST NOT** reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication. Responders **MUST** check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP connection if it occurs.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- The Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R responses. The Testing Station should offer a different CHAP\_I value and should reflect the CHAP\_C values provided by the DUT.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits Login Reject with 'Authentication Failure' Status.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.



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**Test #4.8: CHAP\_C Reflected on Second Connection**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a reflected CHAP\_C key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2.1
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Challenge Value **MUST** be changed each time a Challenge is sent. Originators **MUST NOT** reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication. Responders **MUST** check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP connection if it occurs.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a session of SessionType=Normal to the DUT. After the first connection reaches the Full Feature Phase, the Testing Station should start a second connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- The Testing Station should respond with valid values for CHAP\_R and CHAP\_N on each connection. The Testing Station should offer the same values for CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C as offered by the DUT on the first connection, as the Testing Stations values for CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C on the second connection. Thus the DUT's CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C from the first connection are reflected onto the second connection. On the first connection the DUT should offer random, valid CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C to the DUT.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits Login Reject with status 'Authentication Failure'.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable. This item is not testable if the DUT does not support multiple connections.

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**Test #4.9: CHAP\_C New on Second Connection**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_C key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2.1
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Challenge Value **MUST** be changed each time a Challenge is sent.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a session of SessionType=Normal to the DUT. After the first connection reaches the Full Feature Phase, the Testing Station should start a second connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- The Testing Station should respond with valid values for CHAP\_R, CHAP\_N, CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C on each connection.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits valid CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R responses and moves on to Operational Stage Negotiation.

**Possible Problems:** This item is not testable if the DUT does not support multiple connections.

**GROUP 5: CHAP\_N VERIFICATION**

**Overview:** This group of tests verifies the proper use of the CHAP\_N (CHAP Name) key, defined in RFC 3720 and updated in RFC 5048. Comments and questions regarding the implementation of these tests are welcome, and may be forwarded to Peter Scruton, UNH InterOperability Lab ([pjs@iol.unh.edu](mailto:pjs@iol.unh.edu)).

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**Test #5.1: CHAP\_N Invalid**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_N key=value pair where the value is not formatted as a string.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 2, 2006

**Discussion:** The CHAP\_N value is defined as a string.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- The Testing Station should respond with valid values for CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C. CHAP\_N should also be included, but be a number instead of a string.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits Login Reject with status of 'Authentication Failure'.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable. The DUT may require that the CHAP\_N key be configured before Authentication is attempted. In this case, and the DUT will accept a configuration with CHAP\_N > 255 bytes, this item is not testable. It is suggested that the interface which a user will configure CHAP\_N through does not allow such an invalid configuration, but this is outside the scope of the iSCSI standard.

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**Test #5.2: CHAP\_N Big**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_N key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The CHAP\_N key is limited to 255 bytes in size.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- The Testing Station should respond with valid values for CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C. CHAP\_N should also be included formatted as a string 255 bytes in length.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits valid CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R in response, and does not transmit Login Reject.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #5.3: CHAP\_N Small**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_N key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The CHAP\_N should be between 1 and 255 bytes in size.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- The Testing Station should respond with valid values for CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C. CHAP\_N should also be included formatted as a string 1 byte in length.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits valid CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R in response, and does not transmit Login Reject.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #5.4: CHAP\_N Too Big**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_N key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 2, 2006

**Discussion:** The CHAP\_N should be between 1 and 255 bytes in size.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- The Testing Station should respond with valid values for CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C. CHAP\_N should also be included formatted as a string 256 bytes long.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits Login Reject with status of 'Authentication Failure'.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable. The DUT may require that the CHAP\_N key be configured before Authentication is attempted. In this case, and the DUT will accept a configuration with CHAP\_N > 255 bytes, this item is not testable. It is suggested that the interface which a user will configure CHAP\_N through does not allow such an invalid configuration, but this is outside the scope of the iSCSI standard.

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**Test #5.5: CHAP\_N Out of Order**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_N key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The CHAP\_N value is sent after CHAP\_C and CHAP\_I are received.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5 and CHAP\_N where N is a valid value.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits Login Reject with status of 'Authentication Failure'.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject with status of 'Initiator Error' or 'Missing Parameter'. This is acceptable.



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**Test #5.6: CHAP\_N Identical**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_N key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** There is no requirement that the CHAP\_N value cannot be reused, reflected, changed, or unchanged.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a session of SessionType=Normal to the DUT. After the first connection reaches the Full Feature Phase, the Testing Station should start a second connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, and CHAP\_C. CHAP\_N should be the same on each connection. CHAP\_I should be different on each connection. The DUT should respond with valid values for CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R. The Testing Station should offer identical CHAP\_N values on each connection. These values should not be the same as the values offered by the DUT.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits valid CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R in response, and does not transmit Login Reject.

**Possible Problems:** This item is not testable if the DUT does not support multiple connections.

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**Test #5.7: CHAP\_N Reflect (Informative)**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_N key=value pair. This test is informative only.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** The Name field (CHAP\_N) is one or more octets representing the identification of the system transmitting the packet. There are no limitations on the contents of this field. However, iSCSI implementations MUST provide means of protection against active attacks (e.g., pretending to be another identity). However, the iSCSI standard does not specify that CHAP\_N must be unique, and it can be as small as one octet; therefore, it is possible that CHAP\_N may be the same on each side. Thus, it is an implementation decision whether to view a reflected CHAP\_N as an attack or to accept a reflected CHAP\_N.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a session of SessionType=Normal to the DUT. After the first connection reaches the Full Feature Phase, the Testing Station should start a second connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_N, CHAP\_R, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C. The DUT should offer the appropriate CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R values. The Testing Station should offer different CHAP\_N values on each connection. One of these values should be the same as the value offered by the DUT.

**Observable Results:**

- The DUT may choose to transmit Login Reject to the reflected CHAP\_N. The DUT may choose to accept the reflected CHAP\_N, if it has a weak implementation of CHAP.

**Possible Problems:** An implementation may choose to accept only CHAP\_N values it has been configured to accept. This would be a strong implementation of CHAP security. An implementation also could choose to accept any CHAP\_N value. This would be a weak implementation of CHAP security. Neither of these behaviors are mandated by the standard, and are therefore implementation dependent.

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**Test #5.8: CHAP\_N Different Name**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_N key=value pair.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** January 31, 2006

**Discussion:** There is no requirement that the CHAP\_N value cannot be reused, reflected, changed, or unchanged.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT. Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a session of SessionType=Normal to the DUT. After the first connection reaches the Full Feature Phase, the Testing Station should start a second connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C on each connection.
- On each connection the Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R responses. The DUT should offer the different CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C values. The Testing Station should offer different CHAP\_N values on each connection.

**Observable Results:**

- The DUT may choose to transmit Login Reject to the unknown CHAP\_N. The DUT may choose to accept the unknown CHAP\_N, if it has a weak implementation of CHAP.

**Possible Problems:** An implementation may choose to accept only CHAP\_N values it has been configured to accept. This would be a strong implementation of CHAP security. An implementation also could choose to accept any CHAP\_N value. This would be a weak implementation of CHAP security. Neither of these behaviors are mandated by the standard, and are therefore implementation independent.

**GROUP 6: CHAP\_R VERIFICATION**

**Overview:** This group of tests verifies the proper use of the CHAP\_R (CHAP Response) key, defined in RFC 3720 and updated in RFC 5048. Comments and questions regarding the implementation of these tests are welcome, and may be forwarded to Peter Scruton, UNH InterOperability Lab ([pjs@iol.unh.edu](mailto:pjs@iol.unh.edu)).

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**Test #6.1: CHAP\_R Invalid Value**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_R key=value pair when the CHAP\_R calculation is incorrect.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 1, 2006

**Discussion:** The CHAP\_R value should be formatted as a binary value, and its binary length should not exceed 1024 bytes in length. The Response Value is the one-way hash calculated over a stream of octets consisting of the Identifier, followed by (concatenated with) the "secret", followed by (concatenated with) the Challenge Value. The length of the Response Value depends upon the hash algorithm used (16 octets for MD5).

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_N response. The Testing Station should offer a CHAP\_R, of size 16 octets, formatted as a binary, but not the correct calculation from the given CHAP\_C and CHAP Secret.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits Login Reject with status 'Authentication Failure'.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #6.2: CHAP\_R Too Big**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_R key=value pair when the value is too big.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 1, 2006

**Discussion:** The CHAP\_R value should be formatted as a binary and 16 octets in length when MD5 hash algorithm is used. The CHAP\_R value shall not exceed 1024 bytes binary length.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_N response. The Testing Station should offer a CHAP\_R, of size 20 bytes, formatted as a binary, with the leading values forming the correct calculation from the given CHAP\_C and CHAP Secret followed by 0's to 1024 bytes.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits Login Reject with status 'Authentication Failure'.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #6.3: CHAP\_R Too Small**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_R key=value pair when the value is too small.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 1, 2006

**Discussion:** The CHAP\_R value should be formatted as a binary and 16 octets in length when MD5 hash algorithm is used.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_N response. The Testing Station should offer a CHAP\_R, of size 14 bytes, formatted as a binary, with the leading values forming the correct calculation from the given CHAP\_C and CHAP Secret .

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT transmits Login Reject with status 'Authentication Failure'.

**Possible Problems:** None.

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**Test #6.4.1: CHAP\_R Out of Order**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_R key=value pair when the pair is sent out of order .

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2.1, 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 1, 2006

**Discussion:** The third step of CHAP initiator authentication, an Initiator must transmit CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R, where R is a calculated value based on the CHAP\_C sourced by the Target and the configured CHAP secret. The step definitions must be adhered to.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_N CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C response. The Testing Station should not offer CHAP\_R.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT does not respond to the received CHAP\_N, I and C by sending a Login Response with CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R, as this would violate the step definition. The DUT can choose to send an empty Login Response, indicating that it is waiting for the Testing Station to transmit CHAP\_R to complete the step.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject. Although none of the behavior described in the procedure is illegal, a Login Reject is acceptable.



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**Test #6.4.2: CHAP\_R Out of Order**

**Purpose:** To see that the DUT properly responds to a received CHAP\_R key=value pair when the pair is transmitted out of order.

**Reference:**

- [1] RFC 3720 Clause 8.2.1, 11.1.4
- [2] RFC 1994 Clause 4.1

**Resource Requirements:** A Test Generator tool capable of producing iSCSI PDUs and transporting them over a TCP connection.

**Last Modification:** February 1, 2006

**Discussion:** The third step of CHAP initiator authentication, an Initiator must transmit CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R, where R is a calculated value based on the CHAP\_C sourced by the Target and the configured CHAP secret. The step definitions must be adhered to.

**Test Setup:** The DUT and Test Station pair should be able to make a TCP connection.

**Procedure:**

- Configure the Testing Station with the appropriate CHAP secret for Initiator Authentication by the DUT.
- Configure the DUT with the appropriate CHAP secret required for Target Authentication by the Testing Station.
- Open a normal session to the DUT.
- On each connection the Testing Station should attempt to perform a Security Negotiation Phase with the DUT with AuthMethod=CHAP.
- The Testing Station should offer CHAP\_A=5. The DUT is expected to respond with, CHAP\_A, CHAP\_I, CHAP\_C.
- The Testing Station should offer appropriate CHAP\_R CHAP\_I and CHAP\_C response. The Testing Station should not offer CHAP\_N.

**Observable Results:**

- Verify that the DUT does not respond to the received CHAP\_R, I and C by sending a Login Response with CHAP\_N and CHAP\_R, as this would violate the step definition. The DUT can choose to send an empty Login Response, indicating that it is waiting for the Testing Station to transmit CHAP\_N to complete the step.

**Possible Problems:** The DUT may transmit a Login Reject. Although none of the behavior described in the procedure is illegal, a Login Reject is acceptable.